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Abstract
This Essay looks at the state of the law in England as it was when Lord Gordon Slynn of
Hadley was practicing at the bar. The Essay then considers state liability in the context of the
European Union (”EU”) and finally concludes by looking at the current English law governing
state liability.

THE STATE’S LIABILITY IN DAMAGES FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Konrad Schiemann
INTRODUCTION
In the nature of things, from time to time, those put in
authority by the state will misuse powers which they have been
given, use powers which they have not been given, or fail to carry
out duties which have been laid upon them. The question then
arises: what can be done about this?
A topic which exists in all jurisdictions is the extent of the
liability in damages of the state for wrongful administrative
action. Should damages lie where they fall? Or should the courts
attempt to balance the interests of aggrieved claimants against
the fact that potential liability will create a burden on resources
and might adversely affect the manner in which the
administration carries out its duties? Is there a distinction
between administrative action or inaction which was unlawful and
action or inaction which was merely substandard? This is a topic to
which Gordon Slynn made a number of different contributions
as counsel, Advocate General, and judge.
This Essay looks at the state of the law in England as it was
when Gordon Slynn was practicing at the bar, then considers
what has happened in the European Union (“EU”),1 and finally
concludes by looking at the present position in England.
I.

ENGLISH LAW GOVERNING STATE LIABILITY WHEN
SLYNN WAS PRACTICING AT THE BAR

When I first came across Gordon Slynn forty years ago, he
was regularly acting for the defendant U.K. government before
the English courts, the European Court of Human Rights, and
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”). I tended to be

* Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
1. For the sake of simplicity I adopt the expression “Union” throughout this Essay,
even if referring to what used to be the European Community.
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on the other side and, even if I usually lost, always found him a
quick-witted, charming, and stimulating opponent.
At that time, English law had a reasonably well-developed
system of remedies for putting an end to misfeasance and
nonfeasance, but it was recognized to be deficient in providing
adequate financial remedies for damages suffered by reason of
misfeasance or nonfeasance.2 The idea that a claimant might be
able to obtain damages for a legislative or judicial act hardly
crossed anyone’s mind.
Throughout his life, Gordon Slynn was keenly aware of what
other jurisdictions might have to contribute towards finding
answers in this field in which the essential tensions are the same
throughout the world. Here are some examples, the first of
which may cause a New York readership, in particular, to raise its
collective eyebrow.
Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office involved a party of seven boys
who were committed to the lawful custody of the governor of a
training institution for young criminals.3 The governor of this
borstal institution sent the boys to Brownsea Island on a training
exercise and gave three officers instructions to keep the boys in
their custody and under their control.4 When the officers
disobeyed these instructions and left the boys unsupervised, the
trainees escaped. The boys proceeded to board a yacht that they
found nearby.5 The yacht collided with the claimants’ nearby
yacht. The collision, along with the boys’ other conduct, caused
significant damage.6 The claimants sued the Home Office.7 In
May 1970, the case came before the House of Lords on the
“preliminary issue [of] whether the Home Office or these
officers owed any duty of care to the claimants capable of giving
rise to a liability in damages.”8 Slynn, then junior counsel, was
acting for the Home Office, when the House of Lords answered

2. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Sec’y of State for Trade & Indus., [1975]
A.C. 295, 359 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Wilberforce, J., dissenting).
3. Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office, [1970] A.C. 1004, 1026 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1025.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1025–26.
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that question in the affirmative.9 In an endeavor to persuade
their Lordships to arrive at a different conclusion, Slynn referred
them to Williams v. State of New York10 in vain. Lord Reid, the
senior law lord at the time, and a much respected jurist, said:
Finally I must deal with public policy. It is argued that it
would be contrary to public policy to hold the Home Office
or its officers liable to a member of the public for this
carelessness—or, indeed, any failure of duty on their part.
The basic question is: who shall bear the loss caused by that
carelessness—the innocent [claimants] or the Home Office,
who are vicariously liable for the conduct of their careless
officers? I do not think that the argument for the Home
Office can be put better than it was put by the Court of
Appeals of New York in Williams v. State of New York:
[P]ublic policy also requires that the State be not held
liable. To hold otherwise would impose a heavy
responsibility upon the State, or dissuade the wardens
and principal keepers of our prison system from
continued experimentation with ‘minimum security’
work details—which provide a means for encouraging
better-risk prisoners to exercise their senses of
responsibility and honor and so prepare themselves for
their eventual return to society. Since 1917, the
legislature has expressly provided for out-of-prison
work, Correction Law, § 182, and its intention should
be respected without fostering the reluctance of prison
officials to assign eligible men to minimum security
work, lest they thereby give rise to costly claims against
the State, or indeed inducing the State itself to
terminate this . . . salutary procedure.
It may be that public servants of the State of New York are so
apprehensive, easily dissuaded from doing their duty and
intent on preserving public funds from costly claims that
they could be influenced in this way. But my experience
leads me to believe that Her Majesty’s servants are made of
sterner stuff. So I have no hesitation in rejecting this
argument. I can see no good ground in public policy for
giving this immunity to a government department.11

9. Id. at 1071.
10. Williams v. New York, 127 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1955).
11. Dorset Yacht, [1970] A.C. at 1032–33.
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II. STATE LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION
This Essay will return to English law later, but let us first
accompany Slynn to Luxembourg where he also had to confront
this type of problem not merely in the context of the liability of
the state, but also in the context of what is now the EU.
Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”) (article 288 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”)), which
came into force on December 1, 2009, provides, in wording
which has remained unchanged since 1957, “In the case of noncontractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States,
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants
in the performance of their duties.”12
A problem that has, from time to time, exercised the
Union’s courts is whether it is possible to sue the Union with
respect to a lawful, as opposed to unlawful, act. During his time
as Advocate General at the ECJ, Slynn had to opine on such a
claim made by a company that sold foodstuffs for piglets and
alleged that it had suffered damages as a result of the enactment
and implementation of certain European Commission
(“Commission”) regulations. He said in his opinion:
Lastly, on the law, Biovilac claims that even if the relevant
acts of the Commission were lawful, it is nevertheless entitled
to compensation. In so doing, it relies on the German legal
concept of “Sonderopfer” (special sacrifice) and the
equivalent French legal concept of “rupture de l’égalité
devant les charges publiques” (unequal discharge of public
burdens). By virtue of these concepts, an application for
compensation may be brought with respect to a lawful act of
the administration provided that the plaintiff can show that
he has suffered particularly severe loss as a result of the
act. . . . It seems to me that, as regards Community acts
affecting a person’s business activities and causing economic

12. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 340, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 193 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 288, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 147
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
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loss, such an action, if existing at all, must be within a narrow
compass.13

He considered, and the Court accepted, that on the facts of
that case, no such liability arose.14 However, the Court left open
whether in principle any such action could lie in some
circumstances.15 That position of ruling out liability in the case
under review, but leaving the door open has been consistently
followed by the Court ever since.
A recent example is Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri
Montecchio Spa (“FIAMM”).16 The complicated underlying facts of
this case arose out of the “banana war” between the EU and the
United States. The EU had, by regulation, taken various
measures (the “banana measures”) against the importation of
bananas, which measures were ruled unlawful by the appellate
mechanisms of the WTO.17 As a result, the United States had,
pursuant to provisions contained in the WTO regime, imposed
various retaliatory restrictions on, among other things, the
importation of batteries and spectacle cases from the EU into the
United States (the “retaliatory measures”).18 These retaliatory
measures had allegedly caused FIAMM and the Fedon company
damage.19 For various reasons not presently relevant, the ECJ was
not prepared to proceed on the basis that the banana measures
were unlawful. FIAMM and others claimed that, even supposing
that the banana measures had been lawful, the Union should be
liable for doing something which had caused them substantial
harm—notwithstanding the fact that neither of them had
anything whatsoever to do with bananas—and they were the
innocent victims of retaliatory measures taken by the United
States.20

13. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, SA Biovilac NV v. Eur. Econ. Cmty., Case
59/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, 4091.
14. Biovlac, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, ¶ 26.
15. Id. ¶ 28.
16. Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) v.
Council, Joined Cases C-120 & C-121/06 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513.
17. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
18. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶ 20.
19. Id. ¶ 30.
20. Id. ¶ 31.
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In FIAMM, the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) held that the
Community could, in principle, be liable without unlawfulness
having been shown.21 It said in its judgment:
When damage is caused by conduct of the Community
institution not shown to be unlawful, the Community can
incur non-contractual liability if the conditions as to
sustaining actual damage, to the causal link between that
damage and the conduct of the Community institution and
to the unusual and special nature of the damage in question
are all met.22

However, the CFI held that on the facts of the case the Council of
the European Union (“Council”) and Commission were not
liable.23
FIAMM and Fedon appealed.24 The Council and the
Commission cross-appealed the ruling, arguing that there could
be liability in principle for a lawful act. As to this, Advocate
General Maduro, like the CFI, was in favor of giving a remedy in
damages in some circumstances for a lawful act. He said:
The establishment of a principle of no-fault Community
liability could take its inspiration from the notion of the
equality of citizens in bearing public burdens on which
French administrative law has based liability for legislation.
The reasoning may be summarised as follows: as all public
activity is assumed to benefit society as a whole, it is normal
that citizens must bear the resulting burdens without
compensation, but if, in the general interest, the public
authorities cause particularly serious damage to certain
individuals and to them alone, the result is a burden that
does not normally fall on them and which must give rise to
compensation; the compensation, borne by society via
taxation, restores the equality that has been upset. .
This idea is not very far removed from the
‘Sonderopfertheorie’ of German law, according to which
individuals who, by reason of lawful public action, suffer a
‘special sacrifice’, that is to say damage equivalent to
expropriation, must be granted reparation. Presented in this
21. Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) v.
Council, Case T-69/00, [2005] E.C.R. II-5393.
22. Id. ¶ 160.
23. Id. ¶ 214.
24. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶ 1.
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manner, no-fault Community liability could also be based on
property rights, which are protected in the Community legal
system as a general principle of law in accordance with the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It
would express the idea that even lawful action by the
Community’s legislative body cannot have an effect
equivalent to expropriation without compensation being
granted.25

In a footnote to this passage, referring to the citation above from
Biovilac, he says, “For an early example of such an insight, see the
Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in Biovilac v.
EEC”26—an indication of the fact that Slynn’s influence is still felt
many years after his departure from the Court. Another
indication, of course, is that his former Legal Secretary, Eleanor
Sharpston, is now an Advocate General at the ECJ.
On the cross-appeal in FIAMM, notwithstanding the opinion
of its Advocate General, the ECJ pursued its normal cautious
course and, while leaving open the possibility that in some
circumstances there might be an award of damages in respect of
an action which was lawful, refused in the instant case to approve
any award. The Court said:
[T]he Council has contended that the FIAMM and Fedon
judgments should be set aside . . . on the ground that the
Court of First Instance erred in law in establishing a
principle of Community liability in the absence of unlawful
conduct attributable to its institutions or, in any event, in
holding that such a principle is applicable in the case of
conduct such as that at issue in the case in point.
....
It should be pointed out first of all that, in accordance with
the settled case-law . . . the second paragraph of Article 288
EC means that the non-contractual liability of the
Community and the exercise of the right to compensation
for damage suffered depend on the satisfaction of a number
of conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of
which the institutions are accused, the fact of damage and
the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the
damage complained of.
25. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶¶ 62–63
26. Id. ¶ 63 n.65 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, SA Biovilac NV v. Eur.
Econ. Cmty., Case 59/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, 4091).
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The Court has also repeatedly pointed out that that liability
cannot be regarded as having been incurred without
satisfaction of all the conditions to which the duty to make
good any damage, as defined in the second paragraph of
Article 288 EC, is thus subject . . . .
....
The Court’s case-law enshrining, in accordance with the
second paragraph of Article 288 EC, both the existence of
the regime governing the non-contractual liability of the
Community for the unlawful conduct of its institutions and
the conditions for the regime’s application is thus firmly
established. By contrast, that is not so in the case of a regime
governing non-contractual Community liability in the
absence of such unlawful conduct.
....
[A]s regards the liability regime recognised in Community
law, the Court, while noting that it is to the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States that the
second paragraph of Article 288 EC refers as the basis of the
non-contractual liability of the Community for damage
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance
of their duties, has held that the principle of the noncontractual liability of the Community expressly laid down in
that article is simply an expression of the general principle
familiar to the legal systems of the Member States that an
unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obligation to make
good the damage caused.
....
The Court has . . . held in particular that, in view of the
second paragraph of Article 288 EC, the Community does
not incur liability on account of a legislative measure which
involves choices of economic policy unless a sufficiently
serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of
the individual has occurred . . . .
It has further pointed out, in this connection, that the rule of
law the breach of which must be found has to be intended to
confer rights on individuals . . . .
The Court has, moreover, stated that the strict approach
taken towards the liability of the Community in the exercise
of its legislative activities is attributable to two considerations.
First, even where the legality of measures is subject to judicial
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review, exercise of the legislative function must not be
hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever
the general interest of the Community requires legislative
measures to be adopted which may adversely affect
individual interests. Second, in a legislative context
characterised by the exercise of a wide discretion, which is
essential for implementing a Community policy, the
Community cannot incur liability unless the institution
concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits
on the exercise of its powers.
Finally, it is clear that, while comparative examination of the
Member States’ legal systems enabled the Court to make at a
very early stage the finding recalled in paragraph 170 of the
present judgment concerning convergence of those legal
systems in the establishment of a principle of liability in the
case of unlawful action or an unlawful omission of the
authority, including of a legislative nature, that is in no way
the position as regards the possible existence of a principle
of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public
authorities, in particular where it is of a legislative nature.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be
concluded that, as Community law currently stands, no
liability regime exists under which the Community can incur
liability for conduct falling within the sphere of its legislative
competence in a situation where any failure of such conduct
to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon
before the Community courts.

....
It follows from all of the foregoing that, in affirming in the
judgments under appeal the existence of a regime providing
for non-contractual liability of the Community on account of
the lawful pursuit by it of its activities falling within the
legislative sphere, the Court of First Instance erred in law.
However, two further points should be made.
First, the finding in paragraph 179 of the present judgment
is made without prejudice to the broad discretion which the
Community legislature enjoys where appropriate for the
purpose of assessing whether the adoption of a given
legislative measure justifies, when account is taken of certain
harmful effects that are to result from its adoption, the
provision of certain forms of compensation . . . .
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Second, it is to be remembered that it is settled case-law that
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general
principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures.
With regard, more specifically, to the right to property and
the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, the Court has
long recognised that they are general principles of
Community law, while pointing out however that they do not
constitute absolute prerogatives, but must be viewed in
relation to their social function. It has thus held that, while
the exercise of the right to property and to pursue a trade or
profession freely may be restricted, particularly in the
context of a common organisation of the market, that is on
condition that those restrictions in fact correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and
that they do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a
disproportionate and intolerable interference which
infringes upon the very substance of the rights
guaranteed . . . .
It follows that a Community legislative measure whose
application leads to restrictions of the right to property and
the freedom to pursue a trade or profession that impair the
very substance of those rights in a disproportionate and
intolerable manner, perhaps precisely because no provision
has been made for compensation calculated to avoid or
remedy that impairment, could give rise to non-contractual
liability on the part of the Community.27

The Court, however, found that there was in the instant case no
infringement of any right to property.
Turning, now, to the state’s liability for unlawful acts, it is
worth noting that during Sir Gordon Slynn’s time as a member of
the European Court of Justice he was a party to the famous
decision in Francovich and Others,28 which affirmed the liability of
the state for damages caused to an individual by the state’s failure
to transpose a community directive. The Court said:
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired
and the protection of the rights which they grant would be
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when
their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for
which a Member State can be held responsible.
27. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶¶ 161, 164–65, 167, 170, 172–76, 179–84.
28. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 5357.
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The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is
particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full
effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on
the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence
of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the
national courts the rights conferred upon them by
Community law.
It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable
for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of
breaches of Community law for which the State can be held
responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty.

....
Where, as in this case, a Member State fails to fulfil its
obligation under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the
Treaty to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result
prescribed by a directive, the full effectiveness of that rule of
Community law requires that there should be a right to
reparation provided that three conditions are fulfilled.
The first of those conditions is that the result prescribed by
the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals.
The second condition is that it should be possible to identify
the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of
the directive. Finally, the third condition is the existence of a
causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation and
the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.
Those conditions are sufficient to give rise to a right on the
part of individuals to obtain reparation, a right founded
directly on Community law.29

In Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Factortame, those principles were
held to be applicable to German and U.K. legislation enacted in
breach of EU law obligations.30 In Köbler v. Austria, it was held
that the principle of liability on the part of a Member State for
damages caused to individuals as a result of breaches of
Community law for which the state is responsible could be
applied to any authority of the Member State whose act or
omission was responsible for the breach, including a supreme
court of a Member State adjudicating at last instance.31
29. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 39–41.
30. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany, Joined Cases C-46 & C-48/93, [1996]
E.C.R. I-1029, ¶¶ 18–20.
31. Köbler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. 239, ¶¶ 30–50.
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III. CURRENT ENGLISH LAW GOVERNING STATE LIABILITY
When Slynn returned to England in 1992, he joined the
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.32 In 1996, he found
himself in a minority when deciding the case Stovin v. Norfolk
County Council.33 Stovin had been injured in a highway accident at
a dangerous junction.34 The council knew the junction was
dangerous and the deficiency could have been rectified for less
than UK£1000.35 Had this been done, the accident would not
have happened. After Stovin sued the council, Lords Slynn,
Nicholls, and the courts below were in favor of allowing Stovin to
recover.36 However, the majority in their Lordships’ House
denied Stovin any remedy. Lord Hoffman, with whom the
remainder of their Lordships agreed, said, echoing the thoughts
expressed by the New York Court of Appeals cited at the
beginning of this Essay:
[T]he creation of a duty of care upon a highway authority,
even on the grounds of irrationality in failing to exercise a
power, would inevitably expose the authority’s budgetary
decisions to judicial inquiry. This would distort the priorities
of local authorities, which would be bound to try and play
safe by increasing their spending on road improvements
rather than risk enormous liabilities for personal injury
accidents. They will spend less on education or social services
. . . [I]t is important, before extending the duty of care owed
by public authorities, to consider the cost to the community
of defensive measures which they are likely to take in order
to avoid liability.37

Subsequently, Lord Slynn delivered leading opinions in
Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield38 and Phelps v. London Borough

32. Lord Slynn of Hadley, TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/law-obituaries/5127036/lord-slynn-ofhadley.html.
33. Stovin v. Norfolk County Council, [1996] A.C. 923 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
34. Id. at 923.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 958.
38. Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 550 (H.L) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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of Hillingdon,39 in which the same sort of issues and the
interrelationship between public law liability and liability in the
tort of negligence arose in the context of the possibility of
striking out actions as disclosing no cause of action, and in which
the possibility of successful actions was left open.40
A more clear-cut result can be seen in R v. Factortame, where
the House of Lords, affirming the lower courts, held that the
United Kingdom was liable in damages for its enactment of the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 in breach of community law.41
Lord Slynn delivered the leading judgment. Lord Hoffman, this
time agreeing with Lord Slynn, said:
The question is now whether they are entitled to
compensation. The Court of Justice has ruled that this
depends upon whether the breach of Community law was
sufficiently serious. It accepts that in principle the area in
which the United Kingdom was legislating was one in which
it had a wide discretion. In such a case, the breach of
Community law will be sufficiently serious only if the
legislature “manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of
its discretion.”
I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Slynn of
Hadley that the actions of the United Kingdom can properly
be so described. There is no doubt that in discriminating
against non-U.K. Community nationals on the grounds of
their nationality, to which the requirements of domicile and
residence were added to tighten the exclusion of non-U.K.
interests, the legislature was prima facie flouting one of the
most basic principles of Community law. The responsible
Ministers considered, on the basis of the advice they had
received, that there was an arguable case for holding that the
United Kingdom was entitled to do so. In that sense, the
Divisional Court has held that the Government acted bona
fide. But they could have been in no doubt that there was a
substantial risk that they were wrong. Nevertheless, they saw
the political imperatives of the time as justifying immediate
action. In these circumstances, I do not think that the
39. Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 619 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
40. See the valuable discussion in DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT
46–51 (2003).
41. R. v. Sec’y of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 5), [2000] 1
A.C. 524 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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United Kingdom, having deliberately decided to run the risk,
can say that the losses caused by the legislation should lie
where they fell. Justice requires that the wrong should be
made good.42

In 2008, the Law Commission for England and Wales issued
consultation paper number 187, entitled Administrative Redress:
Public Bodies and the Citizen,43 which is of interest to a wider
audience. The Law Commission, following a couple of decades
and more of criticism,44 took the view that English law in this area
was unsatisfactory.45 Some of the reasons for this arise from the
English rules governing judicial review, and others from the
English traditions of: (1) not allowing a remedy for breach of
statutory duty unless the statute provides for this and the breach
is of a kind contemplated by the statute,46 (2) having a variety of
torts rather than an overarching principle governing all torts,47
and (3) requiring the existence of a duty of care before any
recovery could be had for negligence.48 It is not, however,
appropriate to examine these in the context of this contribution.
What is presently of most interest in the Essay, as indicating
a viewpoint formed, in part, by looking outside the United
Kingdom, is the following:
Our provisional view is that judicial review has developed in a
way that is over restrictive in relation to the award of
damages to an aggrieved citizen.
....
What is clear from the discussion above is that the area is
uncertain to such an extent that it requires frequent appeal
to the House of Lords. While underlying considerations such
as liability creating an undue burden for public bodies can
be determinative in some instances, they are not in others.
What cannot be ignored is that the Human Rights Act 1998
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
42. Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted).
43. THE LAW COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS: PUBLIC BODIES AND THE
CITIZEN, 2008, Consultation Paper No. 187 [hereinafter REDRESS], available at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp187_web.pdf.
44. See, e.g., MICHAEL FORDHAM, JUDICIAL REVIEW HANDBOOK 312–13 (5th ed.
2004).
45. REDRESS, supra note 43, at 111.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 31.
48. Id. at 37.
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Rights are starting to affect liability of public bodies in
negligence to an ever increasing extent and exert a distinct
pressure to expand liability.
In considering how to move forward and react to the
competing demands of claimants and public bodies it is
important to bear in mind the two salient issues that come
out of the above analysis:
(1) Recent history has seen an increase in
governmental liability and there seems little to suggest
that this increase will halt or that the extent of liability
will decrease.
(2) The jurisprudence on the law of negligence,
particularly relating to the liability of public bodies, is
complicated and uncertain to such an extent that
outcomes are difficult to predict.
It does not seem desirable to leave the system in present
state. This would serve neither the interests of public bodies
nor those of claimants.
....
It is clear that negligence has developed in an unpredictable
manner, leaving the law so uncertain that the House of
Lords has frequently been called upon to readdress key areas
of liability. Our provisional view is that both breach of
statutory duty and misfeasance in public office fail to meet
the requirements of a just system that properly balances the
interests of claimants against those of public bodies in a clear
and predictable manner. In both public and private law, it
provisionally appears to us, there is a lack of any underlying
principle or foundational structure that could lead to a
simpler and more predictable system. This serves neither the
interests of claimants nor those of public bodies.
....
We provisionally propose to allow the recovery of damages in
judicial review if the claimant satisfies the elements of
conferral of benefit, “serious fault” and causation, which are
set out in detail below. In our provisional view, this is a
natural development in the law, considering that damages
for breach of EU law and under the Human Rights Act 1998
are currently available. Furthermore, we do not believe that
such a development would impose a substantial burden on
public bodies.
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Our suggested approach in private law is to place certain
activities which are regarded as “truly public” in a specialised
scheme where, in order to establish liability, the claimant
would have to prove the same elements as in the public law
scheme. The effect would be to restrict liability in some areas
and widen the potential for liability in others. This reflects
our attempts to strike a balance between the following
competing demands:
(1) Allowing citizens to obtain redress where they are
adversely affected by the acts or omissions of a public
body in a wider range of governmental activity than is
currently the case in private law; and
(2) Appreciating that public bodies are subject to a
wide range of competing demands and are thus in a
special position. This means that imposing general
negligence liability may not be in the interests of justice
as it could adversely affect the activities of the public
body and therefore harm the general public.49

Legislators and judges in the United Kingdom have, over
the last forty years, been increasingly conscious of legal
developments on the continent of Europe and have seen the
merit of some of them. They, like other mortals, tend to react to
the stimuli to which they are exposed. One of these was Lord
Slynn. The advantage he had was that, by reason of his French
wife, his wide exposure to a number of different jurisdictions,
and his own indefatigable taste for travel and for meeting
scholars from all over the world, his own mind had considerable
breadth. Others have benefited from it.

49. Id. at 60, 67, 75–76.

